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A BEAR MARKET FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REGULATION OF
COMMODITY TRADING ADVISERS UNDER THE
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commodities Exchange Act (the "CEA" or the "Act") makes it
unlawful to engage in the business of providing commodity trading advice
without registering as a commodities trading adviser ("CTA") with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the "Commission" or the
"CFTC").' Since the Act's amendment in the early 1970s, the Commission
and courts have upheld the constitutionality of the Act's registration
requirements as applied to providers of indirect impersonal commodity
trading advice.2 Specifically, they have found that the Act does not violate
the First Amendment prohibition against government abridgment of the
freedoms of speech and of the press.3
Recently, investors, CTAs and commentators began to question the
constitutionality of the Act's restrictions,4 citing a decade old Supreme Court
1. See 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1994). This section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any commodity
trading advisor ... , unless registered under this chapter, to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his business as such commodity trading
advisor.... Id.
2. See, e.g., Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F.2d 192, 197 (7th Cir. 1977);
In re Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 25,657 (CFTC Feb. 8,
1993), rev'don other grounds, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993).
The most common example of indirect, impersonal trading advice is that of a CTA who publishes
a newsletter in which he gives his opinion on prices of commodity futures.
3. See Savage, 548 F.2d at 197; In re Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCII) at 40,143. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. The Northern District of Illinois dismissed a CTA's First Amendment challenge to the CEA's
registration requirements in July 1997 on the grounds that the issue was not ripe for adjudication. See
Commodity Trend Service, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97 Civ. 2362 (N.D. Ill.
July 29, 1997), discussed in Registration: Court Dismisses Free Speech Challenge to CEA's CTA
Registration Requirements, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1114 (Aug. 8, 1997).
Additionally, a lawsuit making similar First Amendment challenges to these requirements has
been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See Taucher v. Bom, Civil No. 97-
1711 RMU (D.D.C., Jul. 30, 1997), cited in Commodity Trading Advisors: CFTC's Registration
Requirements Face Free Speech Challenge by Small Publishers, 29 SEC, REG. L. REP. (BNA) 1081
(Aug. 1, 1997).
Commentators in the press also voice opposition to these requirements. See, e.g., Jane Kirtley,
CFTC Shouldn't License the Press, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A21; Roger Runningen, Free
Speech Battle Hits Commodities, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at 47; Aaron Luchetti, Commodity
Newsletter Publishers Claim Infringement of First Amendment Rights, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1997, at
1121
Washington University Open Scholarship
1122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
case, Lowe v. SEC,5 for support. In dicta, Lowe stated that similar universal
registration requirements imposed on investment advisers ("I/s'2 by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA") were unconstitutional. Despite
Lowe, the Commission has steadfastly refused to ease the CEA's restrictions
on CTAs who provide indirect, impersonal trading advice.7 As a result, these
commentators claim that there is currently a groundless disparity in treatment
between IAs who provide indirect, impersonal securities trading advice and
CTAs who provide the same type of trading advice for commodities. The
former are free from any registration requirements, while the latter remain
subject to exactly the same requirements that the Supreme Court described as
unconstitutional in Lowe v. SEC.8 The restrictions on CTAs seem even more
arbitrary when one considers that the exact same advice which would violate
the CEA if sold to a few clients, may be published with full First Amendment
protection in a magazine or newspaper such as Barron's or The Wall Street
Journal
This Note will analyze the CEA's requirements as applied to a
hypothetical market newsletter-the prototypical example of indirect,
impersonal trading advice. Our hypothetical newsletter is distributed by a
CTA to paying subscribers to provide them with the CTA's market opinions
and trading suggestions.9 Our newsletter has limited but regular circulation to
the CTA's clients, and our CTA does not provide any personalized trading
advice to any of his clients. I0
C15.
5. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
6. See Lowe, 472 U.S. 181. The Lowe court interpreted the IAA's statutory exclusions to
exclude providers of indirect, impersonal trading advice from the IAA's registration requirements. See
id. at 204-11. The court stated in dicta that the registration requirements of the IA were
unconstitutional as applied to LAs who provided impersonal, indirect trading advice. See id. at 205-07.
7. See In re Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 40,143.;
CFTC Interpretative Ltr. No. 95-101, [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
26,565, at 43,501 (Nov. 21, 1995).
8. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 205,210-11 nn.58-59.
9. A CTA may also provide a "hotline," which is a phone number the customer calls to hear a
recent recording of the CTA's current recommendations. This provides essentially the same service as
a newsletter, but is more timely because the subscriber can have immediate access. Neither a
newsletter nor a hotline involves direct communication between the subscriber and the CTA. See In re
Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.(CCH) at 40,143.
10. To further flesh out our example, we could stipulate that our CTA has experience trading
commodities individually, or as a broker. Our CTA now uses this experience and contacts in the
commodities markets to gather information on the markets.
To add further real world detail we can assume that our newsletter deals solely with soybean
futures. A typical issue would then very likely contain information about the United States soybean
crop, including acreage planted and expected yields. Our CTA would have contacts in the soybean
processing industry to provide their estimates of this year's demand for soybean oil, which is a key
ingredient in salad and frying oils. He would also check with his contacts in the grain trade to learn
[VOL. 76:1121
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The constitutionality of the Act's requirements hinges on whether our
market newsletter is characterized as one of three types of speech activities:
professional activity, commercial speech, or "fully protected" speech. 1 The
Supreme Court has held that professional or commercial activity, such as
law, medicine or accounting, is subject to government regulation, even
though speech is a subordinate component.12 The Supreme Court has held
that commercial speech, defined as speech that promotes commercial
transactions between the speaker and the audience,13 is entitled to some
degree of First Amendment protection, but less than that to which fully
protected, noncommercial speech is entitled.' 4 In contrast, noncommercial
speech that displays "even the slightest redeeming social importance," is
fully protected by the First Amendment.1
5
This Note proposes that the Act's registration requirements are
unconstitutional as applied to those CTAs who provide impersonal, indirect
trading advice, such as through a commodity market newsletter. Thus,
Congress, or more realistically the courts, should eliminate the Act's
registration requirements for CTAs who provide such advice.
Part II examines the legislative history of the Act. Part H examines the
relevant First Amendment case law, including judicial interpretation of both
the Act and analogous portions of the Investment Advisers Act. Part IV
analyzes the constitutionality of the Act's regulation of CTAs and proposes
that these regulations be eliminated for those CTAs who provide indirect,
impersonal trading advice.
about world wide demand for soybeans and the conditions of competing overseas crops, such as
Canadian and European rapeseed.
Our CTA's client list could range from several dozen to several hundred individuals or companies
depending on his reputation, experience and marketing effort.
This example also allows for a stark contrast between the complete First Amendment protection
provided to such a newsletter published as a column in Barron's or The Wall Street Journal, and the
total lack of protection currently granted to the very same newsletter provided by a CTA.
11. See infra Parts IlI and W.A.
12. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (noting that the regulation of a course of conduct does not violate
the First Amendment even though the conduct was in part "initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed").
13. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (citations omitted).
14. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1979)
(citations omitted). For discussion of the commercial speech distinction, see infra Part IlI.A.2.
15. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). For purposes of this Note, "fully protected
speech" refers to speech which is neither commercial, nor merely incidental to commercial conduct.
Fully protected speech must also not be obscene, a concept which is irrelevant for purposes of this
note. See id. Examples of fully protected speech would include political expression, artistic expression
and communication by the traditional print media, such as newspapers, magazines or journals. See
generally 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 20.16-20.17, at 66-80 (1986).
1998] 1123
Washington University Open Scholarship
1124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 76:1121
II. THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGE AcT AND COMMODITY TRADING
ADVISERS
In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act, which made significant amendments to the Commodities Exchange
Act. 16 The Commodity Future Trading Commission Act created the
Commission, 17 added the statutory definition of a CTA 18 and subjected CTA
activities to regulation by the Commission.1
9
The Act defines a commodity trading adviser as anyone engaged in the
business of providing advice concerning the trading of commodity futures or
options, whether directly and orally, or indirectly by written or electronic
media.20 The Act further provides a list of persons who are specifically
16. See Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-19 (1994)). The
CEA itself is the successor to the Grain Futures Act, which was enacted on September 21, 1922. Grain
Futures Act, ch. 369,42 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994)). In 1936, Congress
amended the Grain Futures Act to expand the number of commodities it covered and renamed it the
Commodities Exchange Act. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); see also 1 PHILIP McBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION, § 1.01, at 1-5 n.I (3rd ed. 1998).
17. See7U.S.C. §4a(1994).
18. See id. § la(5)(A).
19. See id. § 6m. The 1974 creation of the Commission and amendments to the Act were a
legislative reaction to the historically high inflation of food prices in the early 1970s which had been
caused by turmoil in agricultural commodities markets. This situation occurred when the Soviet Union,
which prior to 1972 had been one of the largest grain exporters in the world, was forced to import
massive quantities of grain in that year due to crop disasters and rising domestic demand. Grain trading
companies, which became aware of this before the general public, were able to make huge profits in
several ways. They were able to sell millions of tons to the Russians and at the same time exploit their
valuable inside information by trading futures on the organized exchanges before the market reacted to
the new supply and demand situation. Retail prices for meats and breads rose as the higher cost of
grain raised the costs of producing these goods. Public outcry was intense, as consumers felt that
multinational grain trading companies were holding them hostage in the supermarket. The concern
over America's food supply became so intense that the government interfered with U.S. agricultural
trade for the first time since World War II by ordering an embargo on the export of soybeans. See
generally DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN, 192-219 (1979).
In the CFTC Act of 1974, Congress attempted to bring commodities exchanges under the same
regulatory scrutiny as the Securities Acts had done to securities markets. See Letter from Herman E.
Talmudge, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, to Senate Agriculture Committee (May 15, 1974), in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5885 (stating that "the futures market have attracted more attention than at any
other time in history").
The effect of the 1972 Russian buying spree in spurring increased regulation of commodities
markets can be compared to the effect of the stock market crash of 1929 in leading to the development
of securities regulation statutes. For a collected legislative history of the CFTC Act of 1974, see
generally 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843.
20. See 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(A). This section defines a CTA as:
any person who-
(i) for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications, writings, or electronic media, as to the value of or the advisability of trading in-
(1) any contract of sale ofa commodity for future delivery made or to be made on or subject
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/7
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excluded from the definition of a CTA, including publishers of print or
electronic media with a general and regular dissemination.21 However, the
applicability of this exclusion is subject to an important restriction found in
another subsection.22 This restriction limits the exclusions to persons whose
furnishing of advice is "solely incidental to the conduct of the [provider's]
business or profession." 23 The exclusion is thus available only to people
whose main business is not providing trading advice. Parties whose primary
business is providing advice cannot avail themselves of the exclusion, even if
they limit their services to impersonal, indirect advice.24
to the rules of a contract market;
(I) any commodity option authorized under section 6c of this title; or
(Hl any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this tide; or
(ii) for compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning any of the activities referred to in clause (i).
7 U.S.C. § la(5)(A).
Most CTAs fall into the Act's definition under subsection (i)(I), through their advice regarding
futures markets. A detailed understanding of futures trading is not necessary for purposes of this Note,
but a few basics are helpful. A "future" is a contract to deliver a certain commodity, at a certain place
and future time at a set price. See I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.02[3], at 1-19. The CEA
governs all futures that are traded in an organized exchange, whether or not the underlying product is
traditionally considered a commodity. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(i); I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note
16, § 1.02[l], at 1-7, 1-10 & n.24. Today, there are futures for products ranging from agricultural
products to stock indexes and foreign currency; all are considered commodities under the CEA. See id.
§ 1.02[1], at 1-7.
The fundamental purpose of futures trading is to allow parties to assume or diminish the risk of
market price fluctuations for the underlying commodity. Persons trading commodities in cash markets
use futures to manage their exposure to price fluctuations. Few futures contracts ever result in actual
deliveries of the underlying commodity. The most active futures market in the world is the Chicago
Board of Trade. For a general overview of futures trading see generally I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra
note 16, §§ 1.01-1.16, at 1-1 to 1-215. For a detailed explanation of the mechanics of futures trading,
see JAKE BERNSTEIN, HOW THE FUTURES MARKETS WORK (1989); CHIcAGO BOARD OF TRADE,
COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL (1989).
21. Section la(5)(B) states: "Subject to subparagraph (C), the term "commodity trading adviser
does not include... (iv) the publisher or producer of any print or electronic data of general and regular
dissemination, including its employees...." Were it not for the restriction discussed immediately
below, this language would exclude most CTAs who provide trading advice solely through newsletters
and hotlines. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text
22. See 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(BXi) (1994).
23. Id. § la(5)(C).
24. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5864. The legislative history of the Act states:
[Tihe [Senate Agriculture Committee] wished to make clear that many individuals who are
engaged in the buying and selling of commodities may, in the course of their arms-length
transactions with customers, offer opinions on the value of commodities or commodity futures
which are entirely gratuitous. Any such incidental expression of views does not bring either an
employee or his employer within the definition ofa "commodity trading advisor."
Id. Congress primarily intended the exclusion to protect only two types of entities: traditional news
publishers, such as newspapers and magazines, and traders of physical, "cash" commodities, who in
the course of dealing with their trading partners and customers typically give free advice on the futures
markets. Large, sophisticated traders typically provide their opinions or advice on futures markets as a
free service in order to develop customer loyalty. All players in the commodity markets are acutely
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It is unlawful for a person falling within the definition of a CTA to
provide any trading advice unless registered as a CTA.25 Registration is a
complex and cumbersome process, requiring, among other things, disclosure
of the CTA's financial assets, prior criminal convictions and fingerprinting.26
The Commission can deny registration on several grounds, including prior
regulatory violations, felony convictions, willful misstatements or omissions
on the registration statement and anything else deemed to be "good cause.' 2
Providing ading advice without registration exposes the CTA to criminal
liability,28 fines 2 9 injunctions30 and private remedies.31
interested in the futures prices, because changes in the price of grain futures are usually translated
quickly into the cash price of the physical commodity market. See I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note
16, § 1.03[2], at 1-83.
Congress did not intend to create an exclusion for publishers of impersonal trading advice who
make advising their primary business. CTAs whose main business is providing indirect, impersonal
trading advice through newsletters or other means cannot make use of these exclusions and remain
subject to the Act's requirements. See In re Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 25,657, at 40,149 (CFTC Feb. 8, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir.
1993). See also infra Part II.B.
25. See 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (1994).
26. See 17 C.F.RI § 3.10 (1997). This regulation lays out the forms required to be used by
registering CTAs. Registrants must fill out one Form 7-R, which is a questionnaire regarding
registering firms. See id. Form 7-R includes questions regarding general information on the firm, such
as addresses and financial information. It also includes a "Disciplinary History" section, which
includes questions regarding the firm's history of felonies, violations of commodity laws, disbarments
and disqualifications to participate in government contracts. See Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 3515, at
3596-97, Form 7-R, Items 11-12.
In addition to Form 7-R, which must be filled out for the firm, section 3.10 requires that each
person who is a principal of the firm must fill out a Form 8-R. See 17 C.F.R. § 3.10(2)(i). Form 8-R
includes its own "Disciplinary History" section, which is more detailed and more personal than Form
7-R Among other things, it asks the registrant to disclose whether the registrant, or any entity the
registrant has ever controlled, has: been subject to disciplinary proceedings brought by the CFTC,
SEC, any foreign or domestic commodities or securities exchanges, or any professional associations;
convicted or found guilty of any felony; been found guilty of violating the CEA, the Securities Act of
1933 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Investment Advisors Act of 1940; been fired due to a
"complaint" by a customer, or filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapters 7 or II. See Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 3521, at 3620-21, Form 8-R, Items 14-22.
Additionally, section 3.10 requires each person filing a Form 8-R to submit a set of fingerprints on
a fingerprint card with the form. See 17 C.F.R. § 3.10(2)(i); see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note
16, § 1.10[3], at 1-177.
27. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3) (1994). The CFrC has the power to deny registration on several grounds,
including, among others: the registrant has (A) violated provisions of the CEA; (B) violated provisions
of securities laws; (C) allowed a person under their supervision to violate provisions of securities laws;
(D) been convicted of a felony; (E) been convicted of misdemeanors related to commodities
transactions; (F) been debarred from contracting with the United States; (G) willfully made false
statements on their registration application; and, (M) "other good cause." 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3)(A)-(N).
The CFTC elaborates on the good cause provision in the Appendix to Part 3. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 3, app.
A (1997); see also CFTC Interpretive Statement Setting Forth Factors for Denial of Registration for
Other Good Cause Shown, [1978-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,005 (March
5, 1980); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.10[5] at 1-181.
28. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5). This section makes it a felony for "[a]ny person willfully to violate
[VOL. 76:1121
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Commission regulations also impose continuous record keeping
requirements on CTAs 2 CTAs must keep detailed records of clients' names
and addresses as well as transactions and communications with these
clients.33
The Act also contains important antifraud provisions specifically aimed at
CTAs.34 The Act makes it unlawful for any CTA to use instrumentalities of
interstate commerce to defiaud a client or potential client or to engage in a
transaction that may serve to defraud a client or potential client. Violations
any other provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder, the violation of which is made
unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter.... Id.
29. See id. § 13a-l(d). This section gives the CFTC the power to seek civil penalties of up to the
greater of $ 100,000 or triple the person's monetary gain for each violation of the Act. See id.
30. See id. § 13a-l(a). This section gives the CFTC the power to seek an injunction to prohibit
any person from violating the act when it appears that the person is currently violating, or about to
violate the Act. This section provides that such an injunction cannot be granted exparte unless it is to
enjoin the person from disposing of documents. See id.
31. Since 1983, the Act has specifically recognized private remedies for those injured by the
wrongful conduct of any person covered by the Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 25. The effect of section 25(a) is to
allow private damage suits, limited to actual damages, against any CTA who has violated, or willfully
aided a violation of the Act. See id. § 25(a). Section 25 also specifically provides that it is the
exclusive private judicial remedy for violations of the Act. See id. § 25(a)(2). For discussion of express
private rights of actions under the CEA, see generally Michael S. Sackheim, Parameters of Express
Private Rights of Action for Violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 51
(1984).
Prior to 1983, the courts recognized an implied private right of action. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). Injured parties may still rely on the implied
right of private action for transactions occurring before 1983. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Kassel, 972 F.2d
1415 (6th Cir. 1993). For the judicial development of implied private rights of actions under the CEA,
see 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 16, § 5.09, at 5-197 to 5-219.
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.33 (1997); see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.10[4], at 1-
180.
33. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.33(a)-(b). The CTA must keep a list of clients' names and addresses,
copies of required disclosures signed by clients, all agreements giving the CTA control over a client's
account, all other agreements between the CTA and any client, all commodity transactions made by
the CTA, all advertisements made by the CTA, and any business transactions involving commodity
markets. See id. Violations of this regulation expose the CTA to criminal and civil liability. See 7
U.S.C. §§ 13(a)(4), 13a-l(a), 13a-l(d); see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
34. The Act also contains a general antifraud provision which covers fraud by persons acting "for
or on behalf of any other person" in connection with commodity futures contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 6b. This
provision is generally aimed at traders or brokers who execute orders for customers, thus CTAs would
not normally be covered by this section. However, a CTA could be subject to liability for fraudulent
conduct under this section if the CTA had assumed some control over a client's actual trades, was
trading for a client or giving the client specific buy and sell orders. See generally I JOHNSON &
HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.10[6], at 1-183 n.842.
35. See 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1994). "It shall be unlawful for a [CTA] ... (A) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or participant or prospective client or participant; or (B) to
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client or participant or prospective client or participant." Id. This prohibition applies whether or not the
CTA is registered, subject to registration or exempted from registration. See id. However, this
provision specifically governs only those falling into the definition ofa CTA.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of the antifraud provisions also subject the CTA to criminal and civil
liabilities.36
III. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT
A. Relevant First Amendment Law
The issue presented by the Act's registration requirements involves three
important classifications of speech activity: professional conduct that only
incidentally involves speech, commercial speech, and fully protected speech.
Each class of speech activity enjoys a different level of First Amendment
protection. The first step in assessing the constitutionality of the registration
requirements is, thus, understanding the framework of these classifications
and how they apply to the regulations in question.
1. Professional or Commercial Activity That Only Incidentally
Involves Speech
It is well established that government may regulate commercial and
professional activity, even to the point of a total ban.37 Courts have held that
this power is no less valid when speech is an incidental component of that
activity.38 The power has its limits, however. In 1931, the Supreme Court
held in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson39 that a state could not restrict
constitutionally protected activity merely by labeling it a business. 40 Simply
"[c]haracterizing [a] publication as a business, and the business as a
nuisance," did not allow a state to thereby regulate a publication in a manner
Courts have held that scienter is not required to incur liability under this provision. See, e.g.,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283-85 (9th Cir. 1979). However, the
Supreme Court has imposed a scienter requirement for similar actions under Rule 1Ob-5 in securities
fraud cases. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The similarity of the language of
the two statutes, and the similar contexts in which they operate has led the Eleventh Circuit and at least
one commentator to suggest that Ernst & Ernst calls for a similar imposition ofa scienter requirement
in section 6b and section 6o actions in commodities fraud cases. See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833
F.2d 909, 917-19 (1Ith Cir. 1987) (holding that violation of section 6o requires scienter); Philip F.
Johnson, Applying Hochfelder in Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C. L. REV. 633 (1979).
36. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
37. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (holding that "there is no
[unconstitutional] deprivation of [a] right where [a person's exercise of his profession] is not permitted
because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed ... for the protection of society"). This
principal justifies state regulation of professions such as law, medicine and even hair stylists.
38. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,502 (1949).
39. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
40. See id. at 720.
[VOL. 76:1121
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that would otherwise be unconstitutional. 41 Despite this ruling, the Court
advanced no standard by which to make the distinction between regulation of
a commercial activity and regulation of speech.
Justice Jackson discussed this distinction in the 1945 case of Thomas v.
Collins.42 In Thomas, the Court struck down a Texas law that prohibited
labor organizing without a license.4 3 The majority found that the statute did
more than regulate the vocation of labor organizing; rather, it licensed speech
itself." As such, it operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint4
5
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson elaborated on the distinction
between regulation of commercial activity that only incidentally involved
speech and the regulation of speech itself.46 Justice Jackson illustrated this
distinction by contrasting a state's valid power to bar an unlicensed person
from providing medical care and a state's invalid attempts to bar the same
unlicensed person from speaking about medical care in general.47
In the half century since Thomas, the Court has done very little to refine
the distinction between regulation of a vocation and regulation of speech.
However, in a concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC,48 Justice White proposed
a test to distinguish between professional activity and speech activity.
According to this test, a speaker practices a profession when that person
41. Id.
42. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
43. See id. at 535-43. The plaintiff, Thomas, was a professional labor organizer from out of the
state who was arrested for violating this law by giving a speech in Texas to a group of workers without
the required license. See id. at 523.
44. See id. at 540.
If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not
think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for
exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their
exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order.
Id.
45. See id. at 541. Generally, a prior restraint is "any governmental order which restricts or
prohibits speech prior to its publication." 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 15, § 20.16, at 72. For a
discussion of prior restraints, see infra Part Il.A.3.
46. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544-45 (Jackson, J., concurring).
47. See id.
[Tihe state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do not
think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any
school of medical thought. So the state to an extent not necessary now to determine may regulate
one who makes a business or a livelihood of soliciting funds or memberships for unions. But I do
not think it can prohibit one, even if he is a salaried labor leader, from making an address to a
public meeting of workmen, telling them their rights as he sees them and urging them to unite in
general or to join a specific union.
Id.
48. 472 U.S. 181, 223 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Justice White was joined in his
concurrence by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. The majority opinion in this case is
discussed more filly below. See infra Part II.C.2.
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"takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client," a situation that Justice White characterized
as a "personal nexus" between the speaker and the client.49 When speaker
and client lack this personal nexus the activity is speech.50 As providing
impersonal investment advice lacks a personal nexus, regulation of the advise
must be analyzed under the standards for regulation of speech.51
2. Regulation of Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court laid down the current definition of commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.52 There, the Court defined commercial speech as "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. 53
49. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232.
Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not
purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances
he is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of
professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or
publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's [prohibition].
Id.
50. See id. at 233. Justice White stated that regulation of entry into "the profession of providing
investment advice tailored to the individual needs of each client ... is not subject to scrutiny as a
regulation of speech"; rather, it is a "legitimate exercise of the power to license" the practice of a
profession. Id. However, he concluded that providing indirect, impersonal investment advice was not a
professional activity because it lacked the personal nexus factor. See id. Therefore, the state may not
regulate this activity. See id.
51. See id.
52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson involved a state regulation, prompted by New York's
desire to promote energy conservation that completely banned electric utilities from advertising to
promote the use of electricity. See id. at 558-60.
53. Id. at 561. The Court's definition of commercial speech is a concept in transition. Earlier
cases tried to define commercial speech by looking at the primary purpose of the speech. If the
primary purpose of the speech was to secure a profit, the speech was deemed commercial. See
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that political protest message placed on
back of advertising flier was not protected because publisher's primary purpose had been to use it to
evade an ordinance banning purely commercial advertising); qf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 112 (1943) (holding that advertising to sell religious tracts was not commercial activity where the
main purpose was to preach and publicize a religion, not to make profit).
The Court eventually recognized the potential of the primary purpose test to engulf even those
forms of speech traditionally thought of as fully protected. Indeed, the test could have eventually
engulfed newspapers, which, after all, do operate to make a profit. The Court, therefore, rejected this
standard. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that fact that
newspaper was motivated by profit to carry an ad did not render the ad commercial speech, thus
subject to lower level of First Amendment protection); see also Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (noting that profit motivation for
advertisement at issue is not sufficient for classification of such speech as commercial).
The Supreme Court currently uses a content based definition. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court
defined commercial speech as that which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." Id. at
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Prior cases had established that a speaker's profit motive does not satisfy the
"economic interest" portion of this test and is irrelevant in characterizing
speech as commercial or noncommercial.
54
Central Hudson also laid out the current standard for legitimate
government regulation of commercial speech. If the speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading,55 government regulation of such speech is
constitutional only if the government has a substantial interest in the
regulation, and the regulation advances the government interest without
being more extensive than necessary
s6
The Court explored the relevant contours of this two part test in cases
involving state regulation of lawyer advertising. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar••57
Association, the Court upheld a state court regulation banning all lawyers
from personally soliciting recent accident victims. Although the Court
recognized that this was commercial speech, entitled to some degree of58
constitutional protection, it found that the regulation was justified under the
two-part test. 9 First, personal solicitation by lawyers presents a great
762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385).
The degree of protection to which commercial speech is entitled has also been in transition
throughout this century. In its earliest treatments, the Court held commercial speech was entitled to no
constitutional protection. See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 ("'Ie Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising."). For several decades, the Court interpreted
this holding to cover any speech proposing a commercial transaction. See 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra
note 15, § 20,27, at 131. However, the Court rejected this doctrine in Virginia Pharmacy Board and
held that commercial speech was entitled to limited constitutional protection. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. For a complete treatment of the evolution of the commercial speech
doctrine, see generally 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 20.26-20.3 1, at 129-62.
54. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266; Pittsburg Press Co., 413 U.S. 376.
55. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
56. See id. at 566; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540
(1980) ("Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state action may be sustained
only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a
compelling state interest.").
57. 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978). The Ohio Bar brought a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer,
Ohralik, to enforce a ban on personal solicitation of accident victims. Ohralik had solicited
representation of two teenage girls who had been involved in an automobile accident by visiting the
girls in the hospital immediately after the accident and urging them to retain him as their council on a
contingency fee basis. The two girls did not have any prior experience with retaining a lawyer. Even
after rejections by the girls, Ohralik tried to insert himself between them and their respective insurance
companies. See id. at 449-54.
The Court rejected at the outset Ohralik's claim that his conduct was beyond regulation because it
involved speech as a "subordinate component," id. at 456. "[It has never been deemed an abridgment
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Id.
(quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502).
58. SeeOhralik 436U.S. at455.
59. See id. Ohralik predates Central Hudson by two years; however, the Court's analysis in
Ohralik closely parallels Central Hudson's two part test: 1) a substantial state interest, and 2) a
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opportunity for overreaching and fraud, thereby creating a substantial state
interest in regulating this speech.60 Second, the evidentiary problems
presented in regulating personal solicitation reduce the effectiveness of any
regulation short of a total ban. Therefore, in this case, the Court found a
prophylactic measure to be appropriate.6t
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,62 the Court distinguished direct
and indirect lawyer solicitation. Shapero struck down a state law banning
direct mail advertising by lawyers by distinguishing mall solicitation from
the face-to-face solicitation of Ohralik.63 First, unlike a personal solicitation,
mail can be "put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored or discarded."6
Thus, it does not Xresent as great a hazard of overreaching, invasion of
privacy and fraud. 5 Second, there are effective means of regulating direct
mail solicitation other than an outright ban.66 For example, the state can
scrutinize direct mail solicitation through legitimate screening mechanisms,
similar to those used to screen lawyer advertising.67 Therefore, there is
neither a substantial state interest at stake, nor is the regulation sufficiently
regulation that directly advances that interest without being more extensive than necessary.
60. See id. at 465-66. Several characteristics of personal solicitation of accident victims created a
high danger of overreaching or fraud. First, the lawyer's supposed persuasive skills and the potential
client's inability to verify the lawyer's statements. See id. at 465. Second, the potential client's injured
or distressed condition. See id. Third, the average layman's lack of sophistication regarding the
attorney-client relationship. See iL at 465 n.24.
The Court distinguished the dangers of such direct solicitation from the lesser dangers posed by
broadly aimed public advertising, which it felt presented a less substantial state interest in regulation.
See id. at 457.
61. See Id. at 466. The Court focused on the difficulty of proving the actual facts of personal
solicitation. Personal solicitation is not open to public scrutiny and there are often no witnesses to the
solicitation so it is often difficult to prove the actual facts in court. See id. Thus, the only effective
method of regulation is a strong prophylactic rule. See id.
62. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
63. See id. at 475. Shapero was an attorney who applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission seeking approval of a mass mailing that he wished to send to potential clients who had
been the subject of foreclosure suits. The letter informed the recipient that Zauderer knew they had
been foreclosed on, and that he could potentially help them keep their homes and assets through
bankruptcy law. He then urged the recipient to call him for free advice. See id. at 469. The
Commission refused to permit Shapero to send the letters, basing its refusal on a Kentucky Supreme
Court Rule which banned lawyer solicitation through mail or delivery which was motivated by the
recipient's special situation which created a need in the recipient for legal services. See Id. at 469-70.
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme court found that this rule was unconstitutional. See id. However, the
Kentucky Supreme Court then replaced the rule with a very similar rule modeled after ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, which barred essentially the same type of activity. See id. at 470-71.
The Shapero Court aimed its opinion at both rules given their close similarities. See id. at 471.
64. Id. at 476.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 477-78.
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narrow in advancing any alleged state interest.68
3. Licensing Requirements as Prior Restraints on Noncommercial
Speech
Generally, the First Amendment protects fully protected speech from any
state attempt at prior restraint.69 The modem definition of a prior restraint,
established in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,70 is any state act which
restricts speech or publication prior to its being made.71 Near struck down a
statute that allowed state courts to enjoin the publication of any "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical. 72 The
statute thus allowed the state to prevent the publication of material based
solely on content.73 Overturning the statute, the Court held that preventing
prior restraints of speech was one of the main purposes of the First
Amendment.74
Licensing schemes specifically aimed at preventing fraud are also subject
to scrutiny as prior restraints. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
68. See id. at478-79.
69. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). For explanation of fully protected
speech, see supra note 15. Over the years, the Court has carved out exceptions where the First
Amendment allows prior restraints. Prior restraints may be allowed to prevent actual obstruction of
military recruiting activities, to prevent obscene speech, or to prevent incitements to violence and
overthrow of the government. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). For a
full discussion of the prior restraint doctrine and its exceptions, see 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 15,
§ 20.16, at 74-80. This Note does not consider CTAs who may spice up their trading newsletters with
obscenity, calls for violent revolution or threats to national security.
70. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For additional analysis of Near, see 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 15,
§ 20.16, at 74-80. See generally Symposium, Near v. Minnesota, 50th Anniversary, 66 MINN. L. REV.
I (1981); Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv.
11(1981).
71. See 3 ROTUNDA, ET AL., supra note 15, § 20.16, at 72.
72. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02.
73. The Court faulted the statute for several reasons. The statute was not aimed at the "redress of
individual or private wrongs." Id. at 709. The statute did not act as punishment for publishing such
material, but as a means of suppressing the publisher of such material. See id. at 711. Finally, the
statute operated as continuing censorship of the publisher, enjoining the publisher from resuming the
distribution of the offending publication. See id. at 712. In summary, the Court stated:
[The operation and effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring the owner
or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before ajudge upon a charge of conducting a business of
publishing scandalous and defamatory matter.., and unless the owner or publisher is able and
disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed
and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence ofcensorship.
Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
74. See id. ("In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if
not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication.").
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Better Environment,75 the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited
solicitation by charitable organizations that used more than twenty-five
percent of their funds for overhead. The city claimed that such organizations
constituted for-profit groups and presented a greater chance of fraud.76 The
Court was unpersuaded and held that the ordinance was too broad." The
Court identified less restrictive means available to achieve the legitimate goal
of preventing fraud, including existing fraud laws that punish fraudulent•78
speech without prior restraint.
B. Pre-Lowe Case Law Regarding the Commodities Exchange Act
Only two years after its enactment the CTA provisions of the
Commodities Exchange Act faced a First Amendment challenge in Savage v.
CFTC,79 in which the Seventh Circuit found the registration requirements of
the Act to be constitutional. 80 The court, assuming that CTA activity was
commercial speech, acknowledged that commercial speech was entitled to "a
measure" of First Amendment protection.81 However, without articulating a
clear rule, the court stated that the First Amendment "does not remove a
business engaged in the communication of information from general laws
75. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938), the Court had earlier
held that licensing of the press is as much of a prior restraint as an outright ban. Lovell also defined the
term "press" very broadly to include "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion." Id. at 452.
76. See Shaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37.
77. See id. at 637. Specifically, the registration requirement for all charities whose overhead
exceeded 25% was too broad to be considered intimately related to the alleged state interest of
preventing fraud. See id. at 636-37.
78. See id. at 636-38.
79. 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977). The Commission denied Savage's registration as a CTA on the
grounds that he had been previously convicted of securities and mail fraud in connection with
activities as a CTA. See id. at 193-95. Savage had been engaged in IA activities prior to the enactment
of the CEA. During this time Savage sold stocks that customers had hypothecated with Savage's firm
without informing the customers and gave customers confirmations of sale and purchase orders that he
had never executed on an exchange. These violations of securities laws were grounds for the
Commission to deny registration to Savage. See supra note 27. Savage's appeal claimed that the
registration requirements of the CEA were an "unwarranted impairment of [his] First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech and press." Savage, 548 F.2d at 196.
After the Seventh Circuit's decision against him, Savage continued to engage in CTA activity
despite his lack of registration. Two years later the Commission, alleging fraudulent conduct by
Savage in violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6c, 6o, obtained a permanent injunction against Savage to keep
him from engaging in CTA activities. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction with respect
to section 6o but reversed with respect to sections 6b and 6c. See Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979).
80. See Savage, 548 F.2d at 197.
81. Id at 197 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976)).
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regulating business practices.
' A2
C. Lowe v. SEC and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The 1985 Supreme Court case, Lowe v. SEC,83 considered registration
requirements imposed on investment advisers ("IAs") by the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA"). The provisions at issue in Lowe are
sufficiently similar to the provisions in the Commodities Exchange Act that
Lowe should serve as persuasive authority for any court interpreting the
registration requirements of the CEA.84 Unfortunately, courts and the
Commission have not been persuaded on this point.85 Understanding how, if
at all, Lowe should affect constitutional analysis of the CEA first requires a
brief look at the relevant language of the LAA.
1. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
In language very similar to the CEA, the IAA defines an investment
adviser as any person who advises others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to investing in securities, or issues reports
concerning securities for profit.86 The IAA definition of an IA specifically
excludes publishers of "bona fide" newspapers, news magazines or business
or financial publications of general and regular circulation. 7 Unlike the
CEA, however, the IAA exclusion is not limited to those persons for whom
providing investment advice is solely incidental to their business.
88
82. Savage, 548 F.2d at 197 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 288 U.S. 130, 150 (1967)).
83. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
84. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 16, § 3.04, at 3-60.
The language of section la of the Commodities Exchange Act closely parallels the Investment
Advisers Act. ... [A] narrower reading of the [CTA] exclusion would raise the constitutional
issues that the [Low] Court noted but did not reach. The question would then become whether
prohibiting investment advice unless the publisher has registered results in an unconstitutional
prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
85. See infra Part IlI.D.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(aX1 1) (1994), which defines an investment adviser
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or
through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities."
Id. This is analogous to the definition of a CTA found in 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (1994). See supra note 20.
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(aX I1)(D) (excluding from the definition of an IA, "the publisher of
any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular
circulation").
88. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1994),
with 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(B)(i) (1994).
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The IAA also prohibits an unregistered investment adviser from engaging
in any business as an investment adviser.89 The IAA also includes antifraud
provisions which are specifically aimed at persons meeting the statutory
definition of investment adviser.90
2. Lowe v. SEC
In Lowe, the Supreme Court interpreted the IAA's definition of an
investment adviser.91 Broadly interpreting the exclusion of the IAA so as to
exclude all publishers of any "bona fide" publication of "regular and general"
circulation,92 the Court explicitly held that all IAs who sold advice strictly
through newsletters or hotlines qualified for this exclusion.93 In dicta, the
Court stated that the IAA's restrictions on publishing indirect, impersonal
advice were unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech because this
activity did not present sufficent danger to the recipient to justify the
regulation.94 However, the Court explicitly reserved the constitutional issue,
relying instead on their interpretation of the IA's exclusions to accomplish
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a). The language of section 80b-3(a) is similar to the language of CEA
at 7 U.S.C. § 6(m)(1). See supra note 1.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ... (1) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client .. " Id. (emphasis added).
91. 472 U.S. 181 (1985). In this case, the SEC sought to enjoin an unregistered investment
adviser, Lowe, from providing trading advice through newsletters. Lowe had been a registered
investment adviser from 1974 to 1981. During that time he was convicted of"misappropriating funds
of an investment client, of engaging in business as an investment adviser without filing a registration
application with New York's Department of Law, of tampering with evidence to cover up fraud of an
investment client and of stealing from a bank." Id. at 183. As a result of these violations, the SEC
revoked his registration as an IA. Lowe ceased his personalized investment advice business, but
continued to publish impersonal investment advice in the form of newsletters. A year later, the SEC
brought suit again, seeking to enjoin Lowe from publishing these newsletters. See id.
92. Id. at 206.
93. See id. at 208. The Court created a two part requirement for a publication to claim the
subsection (D) exclusion: the publication must be "bona fide" as evidenced by "disinterested
commentary and analysis as opposed to promotional material disseminated by a 'tout,' and it must be
"of regular and general circulation." Id. at 206. Lowe's newsletters were disinterested, and were
offered with sufficient regularity, thus both requirements were satisfied. See id.
94. See id. at 204-11. A key part of the majority's analysis examined the legislative history of the
IAA. The majority focused on hearings in which legislators discussed the difference between
investment advisers that dealt with their clients in a one-on-one fashion, exercising control over their
clients' accounts, and advisers that merely provided advice through newsletters and other impersonal,
indirect means. One-on-one advising presented sufficient danger to clients to merit regulation, indirect
advising did not. See id at 220-11.
While the Lowe majority chose not to adopt Justice White's personal nexus standard, White's
standard is only thinly disguised in the majority's analysis. See id. at 210. For discussion of the
personal nexus test, see supra note 50.
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their desired result.9S
Finally, the Court recognized that its interpretation of the IAA's
exclusions may remove providers of impersonal, indirect investment advice
from coverage by the IAA's constitutionally valid and highly effective
96
antifraud provisions.
D. Post-Lowe Interpretation of the Commodities Exchange Act
In a 1993 administrative decision, In the Matter of Armstrong,97 the
Commission rejected the argument that Lowe was applicable to the Act's
regulation of commodity trading advisers. Appellant Armstrong argued that
Lowe's broad reading of the bona fide publication exclusion in section
202(a)(1 1)(D) of the IAA should control interpretation of the exclusions in
section 1(a)(5)(1 1) of the CEA.98 The Commission rejected this argument,
emphasizing the different language and structure of the CEA's exclusion.
99
Specifically, the Commission noted that the CEA's exclusion for publishers
of a newsletter of regular dissemination, though analogous to the exclusion in
95. The Court stated their constitutional concerns in rather oblique terms. They started with the
assumption that Congress must have been aware of the constitutional problem of regulating such
speech, and concluded that Congress had intended to exclude providers of such advice from the IAA's
definition of an IA, and thus the IAA's IA registration requirements. See id. at 194-95, 198-99.
Whether or not Congress actually had this distinction in mind is a matter of some debate. Justice
White criticized the majority analysis in his concurring opinion. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (White, J.,
concurring). See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of White's proposed
constitutional analysis.
Commentators have also been critical of Lowe. They point out that the Court ignored the plain
language of the exclusion which indicated that it was available only to publishers in the mainstream
press, such as newspapers, magazines and others whose main purpose was other than providing
investment advice. See, e.g., Lani M. Lee, The Effects of Lowe on the Application of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment Advisory Publications, 42 Bus. LAW. 507 (1987);
Carol E. Garver, Note, Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status of Investment Advice Newsletters,
35 AM. U. L. REV. 1253 (1986); Stacy P. Thompson, Comment, Lowe v. SEC: Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 21 U. RICH. L. REV.
205 (1986).
96. The Court conceded this point in their opinion. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209-10 n.56. However,
the Court stated that antifraud remedies would be available under mail fraud statutes and also under
section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC rule enacted pursuant to section 10b,
Rule lOb-5. See id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R
240.10b-5 (1997).
97. In re Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,657, at
40,144-45 (CFTC Feb. 8, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993). Armstrong had
engaged in the giving of both direct, personalized advice, and indirect impersonal advice. In re
Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) at 40,148-49. Armstrong
disseminated his indirect, impersonal advice in the form of a newsletter and a hotline which gave
telephone access to a prerecorded message. See id. at 40,249.
98. See id. at 40,149.
99. See id.
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the IAA, differs in that it is only available to persons for whom publication of
the newsletter is "solely incidental" to their business. 100 Therefore, the
Commission concluded that it could not interpret the CEA's exclusions to
exclude all CTAs who relied solely on regularly published newsletters to
disseminate their advice, because clearly this was not solely incidental to
their business.'0 ' Given this difference, the Commission found Lowe's
interpretation of the IAA's exclusion to be inapplicable.10 2 While this result
clearly ignores Lowe's dicta about the constitutionality of such a provision, it
is entirely in keeping with Lowe's refusal to extend that dicta to a broader
constitutional holding.1
0 3
The Commission also summarily refused to evaluate Armstrong's
constitutional challenge to the CEA.10 4 The Commission has continued to
espouse this view in interpretive letters issued after the Armstrong
decision.1'0
100. I
[WVhile the definition of a CTA in Section la(5) of the Act bears some similarity to the definition
of an "investment advise" in Section 202(a)(I 1) of the LA, the exclusionary language included in
Section la(5) of the Act is significantly different fiom the language underlying the Court's
holding in Lowe.
Id. All of the exclusions listed in section 1(a)(5)(B) of the CEA, including that for "publisher[s] or
producer[s] of any print or electronic data of general and regular dissemination ... ," are conditioned
on the provision in section 1(a)(5)(C), which makes the exclusions available only if "the furnishing of
such services by the foregoing persons is solely incidental to the conduct of their business or
profession." 7 U.S.C § 1(a)(5)(B)(iv)-(C) (1994).
The key difference between the language of the CEA and the language of the IAA is the "solely
incidental" language found in the CEA exclusion, but absent in the IAA exclusion. See In re
Armstrong, (1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) at 40,149.
101. See id.
102. See id. at40,149.
103. Lowe has been criticized for this split personality approach. See supra note 95. While the
constitutional dicta is strong and broadly stated, the actual holding of the case is based on the Court's
tortured statutory construction of the IAA, which an unwilling lower court need not extend to an
analysis of the CEA.
104. See id. The Commission stated: "As a general rule, an administrative agency lacks authority
to consider the constitutional validity of the statute which it administers." Id. (citing In re American
Int'l Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,127, at 24,568 (CFrC
Nov. 26, 1980)). In re Armstrong's constitutional arguments were undoubtedly hampered by
Lowe's refusal to make a constitutional holding in that case. As a result, Lowe is, at best, persuasive
authority in a constitutional evaluation of the CEA.
105. See CFrC Interpretive Letter 95-101 [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCII) 26,565 (CFTC Nov. 21, 1995) (stating Commission staff position that Lowe does not control
interpretation of the CEA's exclusions, and that the Commission intends to interpret those exclusions
as narrowly as possible). Though not binding on courts, interpretive letters have significant impact on
how parties will conduct themselves.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
While the Supreme Court in Lowe did not explicitly decide the
constitutionality of the IAA's registration requirements, the Court intimated
that these requirements were unconstitutional. 10 6 The similarity between the
registration requirements of the IAA and the CEA,' °7 the Lowe dicta, and the
First Amendment precedent on which Lowe rests, call for a reevaluation of
Savage & Armstrong.'
The Commission's distinction between registration requirements for lAs
and those for CTAs as expressed in Armstrong, is faithful to the text of the
statute and to the technical holding in Lowe. Lowe, despite its bold dicta,
rests entirely on the less restrictive wording of the exclusions in the
Investment Adviser's Act.109 While the publications of the Investment
Advisers and CTAs may be clearly similar, the wording of the two statutes is
not."o This gave the Commission room to conclude that Lowe should not be
extended to the CEA. While Lowe may be merely persuasive authority, the
Commission should have recognized the Supreme Court's message in its
clearly applicable dicta regarding the constitutionality of registration
requirements, which exists independent of a statutory basis for the
distinction.1"
The appropriate solution is for the legislature to eliminate the Act's
unconstitutional registration requirements for CTAs who provide indirect,
impersonal trading advice, while leaving these CTAs subject to the Act's
antifraud provisions.
106. See supra Part UI.C.
107. The CEA, written 34 years after the IAA, is analogous to the IAA in its prohibited acts, and
its aim of protecting investors. See Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F.2d 192, 197
(7th Cir. 1977).
Publications by CTAs are similar to publications by IAs in that both are providing analysis of a
publicly traded financial instrument, usually traded on an open exchange. The analysis involved in
both is essentially the same-analysis of economic, political and other factors which affect the price of
the traded financial instrument. A CTA's analysis would focus on factors such as economic conditions
affecting demand for the commodities, political factors such as subsidies or price supports for the
commodity and factors affecting production of the commodity such as changes in technology, crop
conditions, or weather. An IA's analysis would focus on the financial condition of the issuer of the
security, general market patterns affecting that company's business and the quality of the issuer's
management. Both the IA and the CTA would present this analysis in a format that laymen could use
in making a decision to invest in certain commodities or securities.
108. In re Armstrong should also be questioned, although it was decided after Lowe. See supra
Parts I.B, II.C, ID for discussion of Lowe, Savage and In re Armstrong.
109. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
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A. Analysis
An established framework exists to test the constitutionality of the CTA
registration requirements. 1 2 Applying the framework to our hypothetical
market newsletter, 3 a court would need to ask two questions. First, the court
must determine whether the Act's regulations, as applied to our hypothetical
publisher of a commodity newsletter, are a legitimate regulation of
professional or commercial activity that only incidentally involve speech or
are a regulation of speech itself."4 The government has broad power to
regulate professional or commercial acts even if the acts incidentally involve
speech."15 Second, if publishing our newsletter is not a professional activity,
but a form of speech, the court must decide whether it is commercial speech
or fully protected speech." 6 If the newsletter is commercial speech, the
regulation must not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate
government objective.! 17 If the newsletter is not commercial speech, the next
step is to evaluate the regulation as a potential prior restraint on fully
protected speech."'
1. Regulation ofProfessional or Commercial Activity That Only
Incidentally Involves Speech
The threshold question that must be answered is whether regulation of our
hypothetical commodity newsletter under the Act is regulation of speech or
regulation of commercial activity.
Applying Justice White's personal nexus test 19 to the Act's regulation of
our newsletter leads to the conclusion that the Act is not regulating
professional activity but instead regulating speech. Indirect, impersonal
commodity trading advice, such as that provided by Savage and Armstrong
112. The Lowe majority did not analyze the constitutional issue presented by regulation of
providers of impersonal, indirect trading advice. However, Justice White's concurring opinion in Lowe
did set forth a framework to evaluate the IA's requirements. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1985) (White, J., concurring). This analysis is applicable to the issue of the constitutionality of the
CEA's restrictions with respect to impersonal trading advice, such as commodity newsletters, because
of the analogous nature, if not the wording, of the statutes and the similarities between IAs and CTAs.
See Johnson, supra note 35, at 645-46.
113. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text for description of the hypothetical. This same
analysis would hold true for any provider of indirect, impersonal trading advice.
114. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232.
115. See id. (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
116. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233.
117. See id. at 234; see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
118. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234.
119. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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in their newsletters, involves no nexus between the CTA and the customer.
This type of advice is not personalized to fit the needs of any individual
client, nor does it involve any personal relationship between the CTA and the
client. 120 In Justice White's words, our CTA, in publishing his newsletter, has
not taken the client's affairs into his own hands.121 In fact, impersonal trading
advice provided by CTAs is in no way different from that provided by Lowe
as an investment adviser. 122 Because there is no personal nexus between the
CTA and the client in this context providing this advice is not a professional
activity, but a protected speech activity. The same result is reached when our
market newsletter is compared to the fact patterns in both Near v. Minnesota
and Thomas v. Collins. As in both of these earlier cases, the government
singled out an activity, publishing news on a specific topic, that is clearly
constitutionally protected and deemed it to be a vocation subject to
licensing.'23
2. Commercial Speech Analysis
The next question is whether our newsletter is commercial speech. Using
the language of Central Hudson,124 our CTA could clearly argue that the
newsletter is not commercial speech because it is not related to the CTA's
economic interest. The speech is instead related to market conditions, price
trends and strategies the customer should take to increase market returns.
25
Thus, to use the language of Central Hudson, the speech is related to the
interest of the audience, but not the speaker. 26 As noted previously, the fact
that our CTA publishes his newsletter for a profit is immaterial to the issue of
whether it is commercial speech. 2 7
120. See Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977); In re
Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.(CCH) 25,657, at 40,148 (CFTC Feb.
8, 1993), rev'don other grounds, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993).
121. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,232 (1985) (White, L, concurring).
122. In all three cases, Lowe, Savage and In re Armstrong, the courts characterized the speech
involved in terms such as indirect or impersonal. See Lowe, 472 U.S. 181; Savage, 548 F.2d 192; In re
Armstrong, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 40,148.
123. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 541 (1944); Near v. Minnesota er rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 720 (1931); see also supra Part IH.A. 1.
124. See supra Part II.A.2.
125. A CTA's typical newsletter will discuss important factors such as supply and demand
information for various commodities, the recent trading activity in the exchanges where the
commodity is traded and recent price fluctuations. CTAs also may provide political news in the form
of commentary on current and potential government regulations, and the effects of certain political
leaders and their policies on commodity markets.
126. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 561 (1980).
127. The Court has held that the fact that the speech is motivated by profit is not sufficient to
render it commercial. The speech must promote a specific transaction. See New York Times v.
1998] 1141
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The only commercial speech to be found in our hypothetical newsletter
would have occurred if or when our CTA advertised his newlsetter for sale to
the public. 28  However, the newsletter itself is no different from a
commodities news column in a magazine or newspaper. 29 The economic
interest our CTA has in his newsletter is the same as that of the columnist
writing the hypothetical column. Both the CTA and the columnist are
interested in being as accurate as possible to ensure that people will keep
reading their publication. In the case of our CTA, this ensures that clients will
continue to pay for his newsletter; for a columnist, this ensures that the
column will remain popular and that the publication will continue to print it.
Even if our market newsletter could somehow be characterized as
commercial speech, the registration requirements of the Act would be
invalid. The publishing of trading advice in a newsletter does not present a
substantial state interest for regulation. And, even if there were such an
interest, the Act's regulations are more extensive than necessary.
As already discussed, the Lowe Court found that indirect, impersonal
trading advice presented insufficient danger of fraud to create a substantial
government interest. Lowe's finding in this regard is applicable to our
hypothetical CTA because of the similarites between CTAs and IAs.13 ' The
same result is reached using the direct/indirect distinction created in Ohralik
and Shapero. A commodity newsletter is more like the mailings involved in
Shapero than the face-to-face solicitation involved in Ohralik132 As such, the
danger of fraud or overreaching is not sufficiently high to justify a broad
restriction on the first amendment rights of CTAs. In fact, the case for
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also supra note 53.
128. See supra Part III.A.2.
129. This fact alone should be very persuasive in characterizing our market newsletter as
noncommercial, fully protected speech. Regardless, both the majority opinion and White's
concurrence neglected to classify a market newsletter as either commercial or noncommercial speech.
Justice White explicitly refused to decide this. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring). The majority, however, implied that they viewed such newsletters as commercial speech.
See id. at 210 n.58.
130. Seeid.at210.
131. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 645-46 (comparing commodities markets and securities
markets).
132. For discussion of Shapero, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
133. This is not to say that CTAs have no opportunity to harm their clients. One particular
problem is "scalping," the practice of publishing advice that moves a financial instrument in a
direction that results in monetary gains to the adviser, usually because the adviser has already taken a
position in that instrument. For instance, if an adviser held a "long" position (a position of net
ownership) in a commodity, the adviser may be tempted to publish advice which drives up the value of
that commodity (such as, in the case of a grain, overemphasizing crop problems, which would, if
believed, drive up prices due to concern about smaller supply). Cases involving scalping by CTAs are
rare. For an example of scalping in a securities context, see Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th
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regulation here is even weaker than in Shapero because the CTA engages in
no solicitation of any kind. 134 Instead, our CTA merely provides his opinion
on the market.
Even assuming that indirect trading advice presented enough of a danger
of fraud to create a substantial state interest in its regulation, the CEA is
much broader than necessary to prevent that fraud. The Act gives the
Commission power to deny registration to anyone who has a prior history of
misconduct, even in cases where the conduct does not relate to CTA
activity. 13 Additionally, the registration requirements extend to all providers
of advice, whether they be competent and disinterested or fraudulent and
manipulative. 136 As Justice White indicated in Lowe, this type of broad
restraint based on a mere likelihood that the registrant's speech may be
fraudulent violates Central Hudson's requirement that the regulation not be
more extensive than necessary to advance the state's interests.13
Cir. 1979). In Zweig, a newspaper financial columnist published misleading information regarding
merger to benefit his own holdings of stock in parties to the merger. See id.
Justice White considered these dangers in his concurring opinion in Lowe, and concluded that any
threat to investor welfare was not strong enough to create a substantial state interest in regulating LAs
who provide impersonal, indirect trading advice. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229 (1985) (White,
J., concurring). However, Justice White also believed that the antifraud provisions of the IAA would
be constitutional in their application to prosecute advisers who had been caught engaging in scalping.
See d at 225.
The case for regulation of impersonal trading advice in commodities markets is even less
compelling than for securities markets because fundamental differences between the two markets
greatly reduce the possibilities for manipulating commodities markets. Securities markets involve
trade in thousands of different instruments, which differ substantially from each other. Commodities
trading, on the other hand, involves trade in a uniform instrument, whose properties are widely
understood by traders. Additionally, a tremendous amount of information on commodities is available
from government agencies, such as the United States Department of Agriculture, that publish periodic
information on factors such as crop conditions, international and domestic usage and inventories. See
Johnson, supra note 35, at 645-46.
Justice White also flatiy rejected the SEC's argument that the danger presented by incompetent or
ill-motivated investment advisors who provided indirect, impersonal trading advice was so great that it
merited regulation of the ability to provide such advice. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J.,
concurring).
134. Indirect, impersonal trading advice presents even less of a state interest in regulation than did
Shapero's mail solicitation. Unlike Mr. Shapero, the CTA, in providing advice, is not advocating a
transaction to which he is a party; he is not selling anything to his client. True, he is advocating a
transaction, the buying or selling of commodities. However, the CTA doesn't stand to profit from the
transaction, because he will not be trading with the client. Therefore, the CTA's primary incentive is to
provide accurate advice to ensure client satisfaction. This presents less danger of fraud or overreaching
than indirect lawyer solicitation.
135. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3XA)-(N) (1994); see also supra note 27.
136. See7 U.S.C. § 6m.
137. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234-35. The Court has specifically held that blanket bans on certain
types of speech cannot be justified by the fact that the speech in question has a mere potential to be
misleading. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (finding that universal
state ban on direct mail advertising by lawyers too broad a means of regulating lawyer conduct);
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3. Prior Restraint ofFully Protected Speech
Because our hypothetical commodity newsletter is not commercial
speech, the registration requirements of the Act are unconstitutional prior
restraints on CTAs' First Amendment right to speak or publish freely. 138 The
Act's registration scheme clearly violates the principles laid out in
Schaumburg.13 9 The registration requirement at issue in Schaumburg was
triggered by only a single criteria: the percentage of solicited funds used for a
charity's overhead. 140 Arguably, the Act's registration requirements are even
more universal, in that they apply to any person wishing to provide
investment advice for profit. As in Schaumburg, the speech restricted by the
Act has only the potential, as opposed to a certainty, of being fraudulent.' 4
1
Also, as in Schaumburg, the Act's regulations are far broader than necessary
to prevent the fraud they aim to prevent. 42 The Commission may deny a
license on any number of specific grounds or on any grounds that can be
characterized as good cause.' 43 Seen in this light, the Act's licensing scheme
is nothing more than a prior restraint. It is also unnecessary given the
availability of the Act's antifraud provisions. 144
In cases where the Commission enjoins publication of advice by a CTA,
the resulting injunction bears remarkable similarities to the unconstitutional
injunctions struck down in Near. As in Near, the government injunction does
not merely prevent discrete occurrences of speech, but acts as a continuing
suppression of the CTA's speech activities. 45 The Near Court stated that this
Zauderer v. Office of Interdisciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) (finding that universal state
ban on lawyer advertising was too broad of a means in achieving state goal of regulating lawyer
conduct); In Re LM.L 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition
on certain types of potentially misleading information... if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive.").
138. White's concurring opinion in Lowe said of similar regulation in the context of the IAA:
"Such a flat prohibition, or prior restraint on speech is, as applied to fully protected speech,
presumptively invalid and may be sustained only under the most extraordinary circumstances." Lowe,
472 U.S. at 234 (1985) (White. J., concurring) (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971)).
139. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980);
see also supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
140. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
141. See id. at 636-37.
142. See id. at 637; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
144. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. In Zauderer v. Office of Interdisciplinary Council, 471
U.S. 626, 644 (1985), the Court used a similar "least restrictive means" test strike down state
regulation of lawyer advertising. The CEA provides for both private and government remedies for any
violation of the Act, including fraudulent conduct. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1994); see also supra notes 28-
31.
145. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,712 (1931).
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The publication of commodity newsletters by CTAs is fully protected,
noncommercial speech. The best solution would be to eliminate the Act's
CTA registration requirements with respect to market newsletters such as the
one in our hypothetical, while still including the provider in the definition of
a CTA.147 This could be done by either the legislature or the courts.
Legislative change would be the ideal solution. Congress could easily
amend the Act by deleting the registration requirements for CTAs who
provide only indirect, impersonal trading advice.1 48 Congress could write a
new exemption from registration that exempted providers of impersonal,
indirect trading advice. For example, section 6m, which imposes the
registration requirement, could be amended as follows:
Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to any
commodity trading advisor whose activities shall solely consist of
providing impersonal trading advice through indirect media such as
newsletters, chart services or recorded messages transmitted by mail,
fax, recorded audio messages, electronic mail or other method of
transmission not involving any direct contact between the commodity
trading advisor and recipient.
149
146. See id. at 712; see also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
147. A finding that the investment advice should be classified as commercial speech would allow
for greater regulation by the State, because commercial speech is afforded less constitutional
protection. In this case, the First Amendment would merely require a narrower focus than that of the
current requirements. See supra Parts III.A.2 & IV.A.2.
148. Bills have recently been discussed in both houses that would deregulate portions of the
commodities markets, however neither of these bills contain any provisions for the CEA's regulation
of CTAs. The bills have been introduced by Republican Senator Richard Lugar, see S. 257, 105th
Cong. (1997), and Republican Representative Thomas Ewing, see H.R. 467, 105th Cong. (1997).
Congress should include the above proposed exclusion for providers of indirect, impersonal trading
advice in this reform package.
149. By mimicking the Lowe Court's use of the term "impersonal" to describe the exempted
advice, this language would cover the same type of trading advice that the Lowe Court found to be
protected. Congress could add this exemption to the currently existing exemption of CTAs who
provide advice to less than 15 people. See 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1994).
The legislature may not need to deregulate completely providers of impersonal, indirect trading
advice. It may be constitutionally permissible to require minimum disclosure requirements. For
example, CTAs with a history of criminal or regulatory violations could be required to disclose this
fact. Therefore, potential clients would have notice of the CTA's past performance. Courts have held
that disclosure requirements are sometimes permissible. See Zauderer v. Office of Interdisciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) (holding that state may require disclosure of certain information, so
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By doing so, the problem of unconstitutional regulation of the press would be
avoided, while at the same time CTAs still would be covered specifically by
the antifraud provisions of the Act.150
The antifraud provisions give the government the power to prosecute or
to seek civil penalties against CTAs who engage in fraudulent activities."
They thus provide powerful deterrents to those who may try to use CTA
status to defraud their clients, while at the same time assuring First
Amendment protection to nonfraudulent CTAs.15
2
CTAs would also remain subject to the record keeping requirements
imposed by Commission regulations.153 The record keeping requirements
serve a valuable evidentiary function in that, should a CTA come under
suspicion of fraudulent practices, the record keeping provisions ensure that
there will be evidence of any fraud.15 4
Despite the merits of a legislative solution, the more probable solution
will be judicial.' 55 The appropriate judicial decision would be to hold that the
CTA's registration requirements are unconstitutional, as applied to CTAs
long as it does not seek to "prescribe what shall be orthodox" in matters such as politics, religion or
nationalism) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). However,
courts are less likely to uphold disclosure requirements in fully protected speech cases than in
commercial cases. See id It is not certain that such a disclosure requirement would be permissible for
CTAs providing impersonal, indirect trading advice.
150. The antifraud provisions specifically covering CTAs apply to all CTAs whether or not
required to register. See 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1994). The Act's special antifraud provision for CTAs applies
to any person satisfying the definition of a CTA. By leaving the definition of CTA unchanged, but
eliminating the registration requirements, unregistered CTAs would still be subject to the antifraud
provisions. See id.
151. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994); see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
152. The antifraud provisions, which penalize the misrepresentation of or failure to disclose
material facts, do not present the same constitutional problems as the broader registration
requirements. Courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of antifraud measures as valid
means of preventing fraudulent speech. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better
Environment 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) ("[F]mudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited and the
penal laws used to punish such conduct directly."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,
has never been protected for its own sake.').
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.33 (1997); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text
154. If the CTA has failed to keep records, or destroyed records, then the CTA would be subject to
civil and criminal penalties. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)(4), 13a-1(d), 13a-l(a) (1994); see also supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text.
155. There has already been substantial opposition to the two most recent reform bills aimed at the
commodities markets. Predictably, the Commission has portrayed any attempt to deregulate
commodities markets as a case of big business trying to ride over the small, defenseless investor. See
Commodity Exchange Act: Congress Should Consider Negative Effects of CEA Reform Bills, GFOA
Says, 29 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 832 (June 13, 1997); Paul G. Barr, Change Sweeping Futures
Industry: Deregulation, EMU Alter Landscape, PENSIONS & INVES., Mar. 17, 1997, at 3; Roger
Runningen, Exchanges Face Hurdles in Fightfor Deregulation, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 19, 1997, at 47.
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who provide indirect, impersonal trading advice.'56 A court should
characterize the Act's registration requirements as unconstitutional regulation
of fully protected speech. In doing so, the court should take care to limit its
holding to the registration requirements. The Court should clearly indicate
that neither the Act's antifraud provisions nor its recording provisions would
be affected by such a holding.
5 7
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress should repeal the registration requirements of the Commodities
Exchange Act as applied to providers of indirect, impersonal commodity
trading advice. The Act's requirements are infiingements on the First
Amendment guarantee of a free press. In the absence of legislative action,
courts should strike down these requirements. In either case, any resolution
of this issue should leave intact the Act's antifraud provisions which provide
needed protection to market players who rely on this type of advice.
Phillip R. Stanton
156. An approach consistent with Lowe would be innappropriate given the statutory language of
the CEA's definition of a CTA, which has much narrow exclusions than the IAA. Any person claiming
an exclusion from the CEA's classification as a CTA must meet the condition that the provision of
trading advice be "solely incidental" to that person's business. See In re Armstrong, [1992-1994
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.(CCH) 25,657, at 40,149 (CFTC Feb. 8, 1993), revd on other
grounds, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the legislative history of the CEA demonstrates that CTAs who provide indirect,
impersonal trading advice were within the contemplation of lawmakers when constructing the Act's
registration requirements. See supra note 24.
157. See supra notes 152-54 for discussion of the importance of the Act's antifraud and recording
provisions. The Lowe opinion produced an undesirable result with respect to regulation of IAAs. By
straining the interpretation of the IAA's definition of investment adviser, the Court left in doubt the
ability of the government and private parties to use the IAA's antifraud provisions, the applicability of
which are keyed to the statutory definition of an investment adviser. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
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